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ABSTRACT Democracy is in deep crisis today: this is indicated by decreasing turnout at 
elections, media that blur the distinction between information, defamation and propaganda, 
and the hidden influence of business corporations through tax evasion and lobbyism (Barber 
1994; Crouch 2004; Preiss/Brunner 2013; Merkel 2015). In this situation, direct democracy 
seems to offer a new way to strengthen citizens’ political participation. However, several recent 
referenda have shown that the former can be used by the elites as an instrument for advancing 
their ambitions to power, and legitimating specific (often problematic) political aims. This paper 
uses a theoretically informed historical-sociological approach with the intent of explaining elites’ 
attitudes toward democracy. I start from democratic elite theory, which argues that elites are 
indispensable for the management of large and complex societies, but that they will pursue their 
own interests if not checked by a strong opposition and civic action from below. Six concrete 
hypotheses are developed: Direct democracy increases in the course of realizing democratic 
systems; elites are much more sceptical concerning direct democracy than citizens; the use and 
implementation of referenda depend on the political system (distinguishing three types); and 
the dysfunctions of direct democracy are mainly due to its misuse by elites, while the outcomes 
of strong direct democracy are mostly positive. These hypotheses are tested by looking at 
applications of direct democracy (referenda) in totalitarian, authoritarian and elitist democratic 
systems in recent European history. The paper concludes with some considerations about the 
necessary measures for solving the problems of direct democracy as articulated by the elites.
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INTRODUCTION
Shrinking turnout at elections, decreasing confidence in politics, low 
satisfaction with political leaders, little political interest among the public – it 
is obvious that Western democracy is in crisis. All these problematic trends are 
most pronounced among young and less-educated citizens (Hibbing/ Theiss-
Morse 2002; Plasser/ Ulram 2002; Hadler 2006; Kritzinger et al. 2013). In 
addition, globalization and economic concentration are leading to an erosion 
of the steering capacities of the nation state; “post-democracy” (Crouch 2004) 
is the catch-phrase of the day. In this situation, direct democracy could be used 
as an instrument for supplementing representative government and supplying 
the system with additional legitimation (Barber 1984; Pelinka 1999; Erne 2002; 
Matsusaka 2005; Altman 2011; for critical reviews see Lindner 1990; Schiller 
2002; Lupia/ Matsusaka 2004; Verhulst/ Nijeboer 2007). At the same time, 
we can observe an increase in the number of popular referenda, particularly 
in Europe (Walter-Rogg 2008; Kost 2008; Grotz 2009; Maduz 2010) – a trend 
which is seen by several observers as part of a “participatory revolution” (Kaase 
1982; Schaurhofer 1999; Schiller/ Mittendorf 2002; Schotten/ Kamps 2014). 
However, important recent referenda – such as the vote of the British to leave 
the EU, or the vote of the Turks for the introduction of an authoritarian political 
system – have cast massive doubt on the positive effects of direct democracy. 
How shall we understand and evaluate these trends from the perspective of 
political sociology?
Proponents of direct democracy argue that, through use of the former, citizens 
can be directly involved into political decision processes, corresponding to the 
principle contained in many democratic constitutions that all laws and power 
should come from the people. The consequences of direct democracy would 
be a furthering of political decision-making and an increase in the closeness of 
politics to citizens, which would help to reduce disenchantment with politics; 
citizens and social movements would be enabled to bring new themes into the 
political agenda; citizens would be induced to inform themselves better about 
political issues; political culture in general would become more open, critical 
and competitive; these effects would occur because citizens in fact want to 
participate more in politics (Kitschelt 1996; Bernhard 1012).
However, it is not settled that direct democracy in fact is associated with 
all these positive consequences and leads to an improvement in the quality of 
democracy. Its critics challenge the knowledge and competence of ‘the people’ 
when complex issues are at stake (Schumpeter 1975; Scharpf 1975); they see a 
threat to the rights of social and ethnic minorities; the increasing dominance 
of politically active individuals and groups over the ‘silent majority’; the risk 
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that direct democracy will strengthen the political selectivity of a system in 
which those of the lower social strata, women, foreigners and others are 
underrepresented; many also see the problematic influence of the media and of 
the makers of moods and opinions (Schuck/ De Vreese 2011), as well as posit the 
instrumentalization of the process by political parties and interest groups and 
their lobbies; some argue, meanwhile, that proponents of direct democracy (e.g. 
Habermas 1992) over-estimate the role of rationality and language in comparison 
with the affective and irrational components of public communication (Schmidt 
1995; Müller 1998).
The debate about direct democracy often takes place on different 
epistemological levels which are not clearly distinguished. These contain 
empirical-descriptive, theoretical-explanatory and political-normative 
elements. But since many contributions do not involve empirical results rooted 
in theoretical hypotheses, the arguments between the supporters and critics of 
direct democracy often go around in circles; in fact, nearly every argument in 
favour of it can be warded off with a counter-thesis. In this paper, I would like to 
discuss the role of direct democracy from a strictly social-scientific perspective; 
that is, by asking which interests and factors have led to its rise, and what its 
potential consequences could be. By looking at the roles that political leaders and 
elites in different political systems have played in the initiation of referenda, and 
at the outcomes of the former, we can get some insight into the general functions 
and dysfunctions of direct democracy and new hints about how to evaluate 
it. In order to do this, I start with a sketch of the democratic theory of elites. 
Concrete hypotheses about the behaviour of the elites are then developed. In the 
empirical-historical analysis, I will look at the actions of political leaders and 
elites in different political systems in recent European  history concerning the 
application of direct democracy. In the concluding remarks, I discuss measures 
that could potentially ensure that direct democracy can be strengthened and not 
be misused by the elites.
ELITES AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY
In spite of its grass-roots image, it is impossible to implement and realize 
direct democracy without political elites; persons actively engaged in public 
who try to win followers and to influence politics. The question is what their 
role is, and which opportunities exist for citizens to take part in the political 
processes, including the generation of themes and of final decisions. Elites 
are necessary, both for the introduction of elements of direct democracy into 
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political constitutions, as well as the carrying through of their practical working. 
Informal, grass-roots-level leaders of social and political movements certainly 
have fewer possibilities and less power to implement direct democracy or to put 
topics on its agenda than official political leaders. In addition, it is obvious that 
the political system to a large degree determines if and how political problems 
and decisions can be submitted to direct popular vote. 
Democratic elite theory
In this paper I start from democratic elite theory, which assumes that a 
political system cannot operate without leaders and elites, but – in contrast to 
“classical elite theory” as represented by Pareto, Mosca and Michels – does not 
presuppose unconditional power and the eternal domination and ‘circulation’ 
of elites. Rather, it is assumed that the behaviour and the degree of discretion 
of the elites are limited by the character and degree of democracy (Bachrach 
1971; Etzioni-Halevy 1993:53ff.; Haller 2008:31-34; Higley 2016). In accordance 
with classical theorists like Montesquieu, Mill, Bentham, Weber and others, it 
is assumed that the essence of democracy lies in the division of power between 
different political spheres and actors, and in the establishment of efficient 
checks on the power of the incumbents of political offices. The main form of 
such checks are regular, free elections (Schumpeter 1975). Direct democracy 
can be seen as an important additional form of check on the incumbents of 
political offices and power (Mackie 2009). This normative and ethical-moral 
stance (concerning, for instance, when it comes to investigating and denouncing 
egoistic, manipulative, clientelistic and corrupt behaviour; see e.g. Lasch 
1995) is an important guideline for social-scientific analysis, but it has to be 
supplemented by theoretically induced, substantive hypotheses about the actual 
workings of political systems and the role of direct democracy in them. 
Hypotheses
On the basis of the foregoing, general considerations about the relation between 
elites and democracy, I put forward the following six concrete, testable hypotheses:
1.  Since direct democracy represents undisputable ‘progress’ in terms of the 
normative theory of democracy, we can observe its continuous growth in 
recent times. 
59
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 8 (2017)3S
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
2.  Elites basically have more sceptical, if not negative, attitudes concerning 
direct democracy than citizens (Donovan/ Karp 2006; Bowler et al. 
2007; Haller/ Feistritzer 2014; Wirnsberger/ Haller 2015). Elites in 
power try to resist its implementation. For oppositional elites, direct 
democracy can be used as a means of changing power structures; thus, 
they may be in favour of it (Bowler/ Donovan 2002). In some cases, 
however, elites in power may consider using referenda for the purpose 
of legitimation.
3.  The negative attitudes of the elites are based on problematic assumptions 
which they have about the functions of direct democracy, the relations 
between elites and citizens, and the competence of citizens to participate 
in politics.
4.  In their efforts to restrict the implementation of direct democracy or to 
‘neutralize’ undesirable outcomes, political leaders and elites invent and 
apply different strategies depending on their personalities and on the 
character of the political systems (one feature that has been rather neglected; 
see Grotz 2009). In this regard, we can distinguish between three types of 
system:
–  Direct democracy is normally irrelevant to totalitarian systems, but 
sometimes they also use it as an instrument to consolidate their power and 
to increase the legitimacy of their regime among the population;
–  Authoritarian systems also use direct democracy for these aims; since they 
cannot control the results of referenda fully, they try to influence their 
implementation and their outcomes as far as possible;
–  Governing elites in elitist democratic systems respect the formal democratic 
rules, but also try to restrict the introduction of direct democracy and to 
control its outcome as far as possible; if this is impossible, they tend to 
avoid drawing the appropriate political conclusions from the results of 
referenda.
5  Pretended ‘dysfunctions’ of direct democracy in recent times are based 
mainly on the deliberate activities of political leaders and elites, and/or 
on deficient modes of the implementation of referenda. These include 
the establishment of very demanding requirements for the initiation of 
referenda; the connection of referenda on specific topics with personal 
and party political interests; the unclear formulation of questions and/ or 
bundling of too many issues into one question; also, avoidance of taking 
the necessary steps following a referendum. 
6  If direct democracy is established firmly for a longer time, it has clearly 
identifiable positive consequences for the political system and its outcomes, 
and is supported by elites and citizens.
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These hypotheses will be investigated in the following section by looking 
at recent European history from the perspective of historical sociology; this 
approach investigates historical events and trends from a more general 
perspective than history alone, using sociological theories and hypotheses (Tilly 
2001).
HISTORICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
In this part, I will investigate first the spread of direct democracy in the last 
hundred years or so, and then investigate the frequency and form in which 
referenda have been carried out under different political regimes, the role of 
direct democracy in European integration, and the effects of direct democracy in 
Switzerland, the country which has practiced it most extensively for a long time. 
The origins of direct democracy in Europe
I start from the basic assumption that there exist universal principles related 
to human behaviour and social processes which are contained in most world 
religions and modern constitutions. These principles include the sovereignty 
of the individual person and their life, freedom and equality (Tönnies 1997). 
The idea of political self-determination, as it is realized in democracy, is an 
institutional realization of these principles. The thesis that I would like to propose 
here is that direct democracy also has the essential characteristics which qualify 
it as a basic element of democracy, and thus it constitutes a universal principle. 
We can cite three facts in favour of this argument: direct democracy is as old as 
democracy itself; different forms of direct democracy have been successively 
introduced in all democratic constitutions; and where direct democracy has 
been institutionalized firmly, it has never been abolished later.
Direct democracy was ‘invented’ in European antiquity by the Greeks. In 
the meetings of free citizens at the agora (‘gathering place’ or ‘assembly’) 
of the Greek city states, important political issues were discussed. This 
institution was taken over by the founding communes and cantons of 
Switzerland from the sixteenth century onwards. Its theoretical foundations 
were laid by religious reformers in the sixteenth century, such as Huldrych 
Zwingli in Zurich and Johannes Calvin in Geneva, who developed 
revolutionary ideas concerning the role of individual persons in religious 
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and political matters (Kost 2008:25ff.). Later on, political theorists like 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau ([1762]2005) took up their ideas. In Greece and 
in Switzerland, direct democracy was closely connected with small and 
middle-sized, manageable communities and towns. However, in Switzerland 
in 1848 it was introduced as a central element of the new state constitution. 
During the USA’s progressive era (ca. 1890-1920), direct democracy was 
also introduced into the constitution of many states (Bolton 2014) because 
of concerns about the increasing influence of business interests on politics. 
Elements of direct democracy were introduced into the constitutions of the 
German Weimar Republic in 1918 and of Italy in 1947; after the breakdown 
of communist systems in East Europe in 1989/90, all states also made several 
forms of direct democracy part of their new constitutions. Many of them used 
this instrument frequently: In Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia, between six 
and nine referenda have thus far been held, while in Lithuania, Poland and 
Slovenia between 10 and 13. Some countries, such as Ukraine and Slovenia, 
used an exemplary procedure by allowing citizens to separately answer 
several different questions. Today, there exists no Western democracy which 
does not have some elements of direct democracy in its constitution and 
political praxis.3 Let us have a quick look at some important countries.
In the United Kingdom and France, the representative, parliamentary system 
was seen from the beginning as the decisive institution of a democratic and 
– in the case of France – republican constitution. Thus, efforts to improve 
democracy were directed mainly to improving access to and the working of 
this system – for instance, by extending suffrage to all persons (irrespective of 
gender, ethnicity, etc.) and by strengthening the competences of parliaments. 
The idea of path-dependence explains why direct democracy in these 
countries was introduced relatively late and still is not practiced regularly. 
Path dependence means that the development of new institutions is always 
linked to pre-existing, traditional institutions and practices, and that new 
institutions also have long-term consequences (Mahoney 2000). Reliance on 
the representative system is most evident in the United Kingdom: the Palace 
of Westminster is a synonym for modern, parliamentary democracy, as the 
Acropolis in Athens was for classical Greek democracy. In the case of France, 
however, direct democracy has also gained considerable relevance. As early 
as 1851, one of the first referenda in the Western world was held, asking 
the population if they agreed to the staying in power of Napoleon III. The 
proposition on the referendum was accepted with a high turnout of 81.7%, and 
3 See the useful collection of the constitutions of the EU member states in Kimmel/Kimmel (2005).
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92% agreement; see Nohlen/ Stöver 2010:683).4 Since that time, no less than 
17 referenda have been held in France.
The explanation of path dependency may also apply to another seemingly 
‘deviant’ case – the United States, where direct democracy does not exist at 
the federal level. However, at this level one aspect of direct democracy – the 
personality-bound election of leading political representatives, the President 
and members of the Congress – is also very important (Kost 2009:81). At the 
level of states and counties, cities and communes, direct democracy is very 
strong, as noted by Alexis de Tocqueville as early as 1835 (Tocqueville 1976; 
Lupia/  Matsusaka 2004:463).
A third, also somewhat ‘deviant’ example is the Federal Republic of Germany, 
where direct democracy also exists only at the level of the Länder, Kreise and 
communes (Kost 2008). The reason is that it was feared that antidemocratic 
movements could again gain influence, as they did in the Weimar Republic. 
I think, however, that this fear is based on a false presumption; the Weimar 
Republic did not cease to exist (or at least not only) because a majority of the 
population supported it, but because the majority centre and conservative 
parties did not fight against the National Socialists’ overthrowing of the 
constitution. While a majority of the German population never voted for Hitler, 
a large majority of the German Reichstag agreed to a law which gave Hitler 
extraordinary power and in fact abolished democracy (Haller 2008:230-233). 
The same happened in Italy a decade earlier in 1922, when Mussolini was 
appointed Prime Minister by the king; all conservative parties in the parliament 
and senate supported the constitutional changes that were proposed, thereby 
abolishing democracy in Italy. 
The fate of direct democracy under different political systems
Hypothesis 4 states that the relation between elites and citizens is strongly 
dependent on the character of the political system. In Hypothesis 4 it was 
claimed that totalitarian systems use direct democracy purely as a means of 
realizing their aims; they employ massive disinformation, pressure and violence 
to get the desired outcomes, or falsify results; authoritarian governments also 
use massive propaganda campaigns and pressure to get the desired results, but 
they respect some basic rules; elitist systems follow constitutional and legal 
4  These data are also available in Liste von Referencen in den Ländern Europas, Wikipedia (https://
de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_von_Referenden_in_den_L%C3%A4ndern_Europas; 20.4.2017). 
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rules, but try to ‘control’ direct democracy by limiting its application and by 
avoiding the implementation of its results if they contradict the party’s own 
aims.
Direct democracy as an instrument of leaders in totalitarian 
systems
In Europe, two political systems in the twentieth century can be characterized 
as ‘totalitarian’: the fascist regimes of the mid-twentieth  century, and the 
communist regimes in the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that referenda have 
no place in the totalitarian world view and politics; even their parliaments are 
not bodies with real decision-making power. Let us first have a short look at 
these two totalitarian regimes.
In the communist systems, referenda had no formal place, but a few were 
held. This can be considered the last, strategic ploy of political elites that felt 
they could not realize their far-reaching aims, or did not see a way out of major 
trouble. In the constitution of the Soviet Union, direct democracy was not 
mentioned. The constitution of the USSR engendered a strict representative 
system, stating explicitly that “all power belongs to the working people through 
their deputies, the Soviets”.5 Only when the communist had serious trouble did 
they use referenda – i.e., as a last resort. 
Two smaller referenda were carried out at the beginning of the time of rule of a 
communist party: in the German Democratic Republic, where it was much more 
difficult for the communists to establish and consolidate their power after 1945 
than in the other central East European countries because East Germans still felt 
themselves to be part of the larger German nation. In June 1946, the communist 
party SED carried through a referendum with which they tried to legitimate 
their aim of nationalizing productive private property (Spilker 2006:85-86). 
This referendum was a great success in the eyes of the proponents: 77.7% of 
participants voted “Yes”; that is, in favour of state ownership of key industries. 
However, this result was due to the strategic decisions and activities of the 
government: moreover, it was only held in Saxony, which was a strong industrial 
province, with a strong communist base; a massive propaganda campaign was 
also organized before the referendum, and 1900 small businesses were returned 
to their owners in order to show to the public that only large enterprises should 
be the target of nationalization. This referendum “greatly boosted the morale 
of the SED leaders by convincing them that their policies had the potential to 
5 Constitution of 1936, Chapter 1, Articles 2 and 3.
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become truly popular and win electoral support – not only in the SBZ (Soviet 
Occupied Area) but throughout Germany” (Spilker 2006:86). This was a serious 
misperception, however; people in the GDR always felt that they belonged to 
one ‘German nation’. Also, the massive emigration from East to West Germany, 
which led to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, proved that the communist 
regimes had little legitimation.
One referendum was also held in the history of the Soviet Union. In 1991, 
after several republics of the Soviet Union had declared their independence, and 
ethnic-national movements and riots occurred in many other parts, the Congress 
of the People’s Deputies of the USSR decided to submit the question of the 
survival and reform of the Union to a referendum. The question submitted to the 
people was: “Do you think the preservation of the Soviet Union as a reformed 
federation of equal and sovereign republics in which all rights and freedoms of 
the people of all nationalities are guaranteed, is necessary?” Seventy-six per 
cent of the 112 million citizens of the USSR agreed with this question. The high 
level of agreement is not surprising, however, given the fact that the question 
was only positively formulated, and very vague in many regards; many different 
topics were included in one question.
Let us now have a closer look at the fascist totalitarian systems and their 
view and use of direct democracy: namely, the two main fascist dictatorships in 
Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, those of Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) and Adolf 
Hitler (1889-1945). In contrast to Lenin in Russia, these individuals had both 
established their power in countries which already had democratic constitutions 
and experiences. Therefore, but also because violent attempts at taking over 
power had failed, they were anxious to give their takeover a democratic 
appearance.
The first fascist leader in Europe in the 1920s was Benito Mussolini, a former 
journalist and socialist agitator who moved rapidly towards embracing a new 
ideology which emphasized the role of a ‘totalitarian state’. This term was first 
used by antifascist writers, but was later accepted by Mussolini himself. The 
ultimate source of all power in this state was the leader, whose personal orders 
had to be followed by everybody. Fascist ideology, however, was no coherent 
theoretical system, but only a means of legitimating the use of violence and 
terror against all enemies. Numerous well-known statements of Mussolini’s 
express his contempt for the ‘masses’; in his view, “they are stupid, dirty, do 
not like to work and are happy with little films in cinemas” (Smith 1981:126). 
Mussolini developed his worldview by reading elitist writers such as George 
Sorel, Vilfredo Pareto, Henry Bergson and Friedrich Nietzsche.6
6 See https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benito_Mussolini. 
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The same ideology, enriched with a fervent antisemitism, was taken over 
by the German dictator Adolf Hitler who came to power in 1933 who saw the 
masses in quite a similar fashion. This is expressed clearly in his extremely 
successful and influential political pamphlet, Mein Kampf, a paradigmatic 
representative of this kind of thinking in modern times.7 In this book Hitler 
argues that the main aim of politics is to select the best leaders and to grant 
all power to them; parliaments may exist and function as advisory bodies, but 
they should have no legislative power. An absolute Führerprinzip must exist 
for any subsection of society, and the highest leader must have the last say in 
all important decisions. This belief corresponded with Hitler’s own behaviour 
as leader of the NSDAP, according to which all who did not agree fully with 
his claim to absolute leadership were expurgated mercilessly (Hartmann et al. 
2016:43). Hitler’s ideas about leadership correspond to his opinions about the 
people, the ‘masses’. 
Hitler believed that individuals should be seen as a mass from the viewpoint 
of the political leader, and he compared the masses to women: Both prefer to 
subjugate themselves to a strong man instead of dominating a weak one; they 
are more satisfied with an unitary, exclusivist doctrine than with the granting of 
freedom; not sober consideration, but emotions guide their thinking and action 
(Hitler 2016:500f.). Propaganda, an essential element of political communication, 
must therefore focus on the emotions and present one and only one side of a 
problem repeatedly. It is evident that popular referenda about important political 
matters are with regard to this kind of thinking. All decisions must be made by 
leaders, be they in smaller social units and organizations, or at top of the state, 
the highest ‘Führer’. Even parliaments should have no power to decide about 
anything (Hitler 2016:1129-1142).
I think that it was necessary to sketch out these ideas of Hitler (which were 
also upheld by other fascist leaders in Central and South Europe in the first half 
of the twentieth century) for three reasons. First, because they make clear what 
place is given to popular referenda in totalitarian thinking. Hitler’s ideas are 
highly relevant even today. It is astonishing that some of his central arguments 
about the character of the people and their decisions in referenda are taken up by 
many analysts in public discourse in modern times.
One ‘referendum’ was hold by Benito Mussolini in 1934. It was typical of 
this dictator – as it was for Hitler in Germany later – to try to take over absolute 
state power through formal and legal means. After a parliamentary reform in 
1928, the elections of 1934 were held in the form of a referendum that asked the 
7  Twelve million copies of this book were originally sold; recently it has been re-edited and printed 
under the supervision of a group of German historians.
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question: “Do you approve the list of deputies appointed by the Grand Council 
of Fascism?”8 Of the 10 million voters (who might have represented about 40% 
to 50% of the electorate), 99.8% approved. The voting procedure itself was far 
from secret, and it was declared that the election would have to be repeated in 
the case of a negative outcome.
In Nazi Germany, one referendum was also organized. After the annexation 
of Austria in March 12, 1938, Hitler ordered a popular referendum concerning 
the consent of Austrians to become members of the Third Reich. This 
referendum was arranged by Hitler for two reasons: First, because the last 
Austrian chancellor, Kurt Schuschnigg, had planned to carry out a referendum 
on March 13, thus the invasion of Austria by German troops on March 12-13, 
1938 had been ordered to prevent this. The second reason was that Hitler wanted 
to increase the legitimacy of his rule, at which goal he strongly succeeded. 
Almost all (99.75%) Austrian voters agreed to unite Austria with the German 
Reich; according to official figures, 99.7% of eligible voters (Jews excluded) 
had participated in the referendum. It is evident, however, that this referendum 
was far from a free election; the weeks before, a massive propaganda campaign 
across Austria was initiated, the media were controlled by the Nazis, the voting 
process itself was tightly controlled, and the casting of votes was often open. 
A report of the Gestapo, Hitler’s secret police, showed that in Vienna probably 
only one third of the population were against the integration of Austria into the 
German Reich.
“Take the bull by the horns”: The forward but risky strategy of 
political leaders in authoritarian systems
Authoritarian systems are defined as democracies in which leaders and 
political elites have the opportunity to influence politics to a degree which is 
often barely compatible with constitutional rules and democratic standards. 
Such leaders, who often came to power through coups d’état, are also dependent 
on public consent that they often get through their particular charisma; that 
is, the belief of their followers in their particular leadership qualities (Weber 
1964:179-188). However, charisma is not a personal quality but a characteristic 
of a relationship: It exists and exerts its effects only as long as the relation 
between leader and followers remains intact. A leader can assert the existence 
of such a relationship in different ways: By presenting himself as a ‘strong man’, 
8 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_general_election,_1934. 
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by making far-reaching decisions which show him as a decisive leader, and 
by organising public events at which the masses can applaud him. One of the 
opportunities such leaders have is to carry out a referendum on some important 
issue: if it turns out positively, it can be interpreted by the leader as consent for 
his person and politics. But this strategy of authoritarian leaders does not bear 
fruit in all cases, as I will show in the following section. Even in the case when 
the instrument of direct democracy is misused, it can nonetheless demonstrate 
leadership or system strength. Referenda in two European countries will be 
considered here: Hungary in 2016, and in Turkey in 2017.9
The first example concerns present-day Hungary. In 2016, Prime Minister 
Victor Orbán organized a referendum on the proposed EU plan to relocate 120,000 
refugees from Italy and Greece throughout other member states; according to this 
plan, Hungary would have been required to accept 1,294 refugees. Orbán, who 
came to power in 2010 through the landslide electoral victory of Fidesz (the party 
he founded and that he now leads), and who was re-elected in 2014, became one 
of the most powerful and prominent leaders of the new right-wing political forces 
in Europe. He represents a centre-right, strongly nationalist political orientation 
which is EU-critical and strongly against immigration. In the course of the great 
refugee movements through the Balkans in 2015/2016 he ordered the erections of 
razor-wire fencing and the use of water cannons against immigrants at the borders; 
within Hungary, refugee camps were built. With the referendum in 2016, Orbán 
planned to create strong public support for his radical position against refugees. In 
one regard, the results of the referendum supported Orbán’s aims: 98% of voters 
agreed with the statement that Hungary should reject the EU relocation plan 
(however, at this time 54,000 asylum seekers were already present in Hungary). 
Orbán’s government and party led a massive campaign in favor of the proposal, on 
which they spent huge sums of money and propagated strongly one-sided messages 
to the public, using many forms of xenophobic and racist arguments.10 However, 
while Orbán celebrated the result as a great victory, in fact it was a blow for him 
because turnout was only 44% – less than the 50% required by the constitution 
to make it valid. This low turnout was to a large degree the result of the fact that 
most political parties besides Fidesz had not supported the referendum; many of 
them had asked voters to abstain from participating in the election, or to spoil 
their votes. That referenda are a double-edged sword in authoritarian systems is 
also indicated by the fact that the threat by civic movements in Hungary to call for 
9  In the first version of this paper, I also analyzed the referenda carried out under the authoritarian 
rule of Pinochet in Chile in 1980 and 1988.
10  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarian_migrant_quota_referendum,_2016 (20.4.2017); 
Luke Waller, Viktor Orbán, Politico 28 (http://www.politico.eu/list/politico-28/viktor-orban/).
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other referenda led Orbán to abstain from implementing harsh political measures 
that he had earlier proposed. 
The second case concerns the Turkish referendum on a new constitution, 
carried out in April 2017. This initiative was very important for Europe for two 
reasons: First, because Turkey is a large, populous Islamic country (about 75 
million inhabitants) which has been a NATO member since 1952 and which has 
long aspired to become a member of the EU; second, because the referendum 
was extremely controversial, not only in Western Europe, but also in Turkey 
itself. Erdogan was at least partly induced to propose the referendum because 
of the failed coup d’état against him in July 2016. The official aim of the 
referendum was to modernize the Turkish constitution of 1980. In practice, it 
implied a fundamental political change that would give sweeping powers to the 
president. The proposal for the referendum had to be submitted to parliament; 
even during the hearings and voting of the parliament, many irregularities and 
violations of rules were committed. In the campaign for the referendum, after 
parliamentary acceptance, it was mainly Erdogan’s Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) that were involved, in 
addition to Erdogan himself and his Prime Minister Yildirim; state funds were 
thus used to support it.11 The ‘No’ campaign was supported by two parties (CHP, 
HDP) and high-profile dissidents from MPH party; they faced government-
induced attempts at coercion and suppression. In view of these facts, the 
outcome of the referendum was surprising. Given a high turnout of 85%, only 
a narrow majority (51% of the electorate) approved the proposed constitutional 
amendments. Thus, although Erdogan presented the outcome as a victory and 
is now able to realize his plans for changing the constitution, the result shows a 
strongly divided Turkish society.
We can draw the following conclusions from this analysis. Even under 
authoritarian governments, referenda can turn out against the wishes of 
the leaders if three conditions are given: (1) If there exists a gulf within the 
political elite concerning the issue to be decided upon, (2) if there exists foreign 
‘ideological’ support for the opposition, or (3) if the population itself feels that 
the incumbent leader or government has become ineffective and/ or is liable to 
violate human rights. 
11  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_constitutional_referendum,_2017. 
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How leaders in elitist democratic systems deal with undesirable 
referenda and unwanted outcomes?
Typical western parliamentary systems are defined here as elitist systems 
because it is the elected representatives – parliamentary deputies and the 
governments elected by them – who decide about most political issues. 
Following democratic elite theory, we can say that citizens have only a 
very indirect possibility of formal political participation in representative 
democracies; they can only elect a specific government (and often not even 
that, because governments usually consist of party coalitions which have not 
been voted for directly by citizens) or ‘deselect’ an incumbent government if 
they are dissatisfied, but they have little direct influence on concrete political 
decisions. Our democratic systems are elitist also from the perspective of 
political sociology; parliamentary deputies and members of the government do 
not come close to representing the population in terms of their social origins 
and characteristics. Most of the former are male, highly educated, have worked 
for interest groups or lobbies, and in disproportionate amounts are public 
employees (such as is the case in Austria); the reason is that they can get leave of 
absence from their workplace if they occupy political office. Thus, the interests 
of the groups from which they are recruited are certainly better represented in 
politics than those of other groups (e.g., workers, small-scale self-employed and 
entrepreneurs, women who work in service jobs, housewives, immigrants, etc.). 
Here, I will discuss the attitude of political leaders and elites toward direct 
democracy and the strategies which they apply in this regard. In the course of 
the twentieth century, several hundred referenda have been carried out (Nohlen/ 
Stöver 2010). I will pick out two recent, spectacular and problematic cases in 
Europe which are telling examples of the behaviour of the elites with regard to 
direct democracy. Direct democracy should be employed when a fundamental 
problem of a nation state is concerned, such as a change in the constitution, a 
change in state territory, the accession of a state to a consequential international 
treaty, or the realisation of some very expensive and special project. The elites 
should respect the resultant decisions and eventually implement them into 
concrete laws. What we observe repeatedly, however, is the tendency of elites 
to put to referendum issues for which they have no parliamentary majority, or 
issues about which they simply were not ready to make a clear, often unpopular 
decision. What also happens is that leaders connect their political fates with 
the outcome of referenda. This happened in both of the cases that are discussed 
here.
On December 2, 2016 in Italy, a referendum was carried out concerning 
a significant change to the constitution proposed by Prime Minister Matteo 
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Renzi. Renzi was a very popular, reform-minded politician of moderate leftist 
orientation who had achieved a landslide victory for his Partito Democratico 
(PD) in the European elections of 2014. The reform proposal was developed 
by Renzi on the basis of the fact that Italy has one of the most unstable 
political systems in the world; since 1945, Italy has had over 60 governments 
with a mean duration of just one year; in the mid-1990s, the existing party 
system disintegrated completely, due to disclosures about massive corruption; 
between 2001 and 2011, the businessman and media owner Silvio Berlusconi, 
who acted as Prime Minister, only prevented his own conviction on corruption 
charges by enacting special laws through his parliamentary majority. The 
two main factors behind the instability of Italian governments are the strong 
proportional election system which enables many small political parties to 
obtain seats, so that every government has to rely on a number of parties, 
and the nearly equally strong role of the two chambers of parliament which 
often leads to the blocking of political decisions (Haller 2017). The changes 
proposed in the referendum included, among many other things, a reduction 
in the competencies of the senate, a reduction in the number of its members, 
and a diminution of the competencies of the provinces. Most of these changes 
made a lot of sense from the perspective of experts in constitutional law. One 
main problem with the referendum, however, was – aside from the hurry with 
which the proposals were elaborated – that Prime Minister Renzi announced 
that he would retire from office if the proposal were rejected. This had the 
consequence that all political parties which were against Renzi’s government 
now opposed the proposed referendum fiercely. Pro and contra camps were 
similar to those that emerge at election times: not only centrist and right-wing 
parties, but also the related economic interest groups (trade unions, employer 
associations) and media opposed the referendum, while all centre-left and left-
wing groups supported the proposal, following Renzi. Thus, the proposals 
contained in the referendum – instead of uniting all those citizens willing to 
support far-reaching reform – were rejected, and a deep political split between 
different political camps resulted. This split was also evident in regional terms: 
In the better-developed North and Central Italy, half or the majority of voters 
supported the referendum, while in the south a large majority was against it. 
As a consequence, Renzi resigned from office, extending the deep institutional 
crisis of the state. 
The second example is the British referendum about whether to remain part 
of the European Union, held on June 23, 2016. This referendum has a long 
back story: Since Britain’s entry to the European Community in 1972/73, 
its membership was continually contested, with strong swings between the 
pro and contra camps. In 1975, Labour premier Harold Wilson organized 
71
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 8 (2017)3S
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
the first referendum on the topic, in which a surprisingly large proportion of 
voters – 67.2% – were in favour of remaining in the EC. Among the reasons 
for this result were the popularity of Wilson, his former negotiations with the 
EU, and the support of all main political parties and influential newspapers 
for remaining. In the following decades, the Labour Party and the public 
mind shifted toward a more critical EU stance, as did that of the Tories 
under Margaret Thatcher’s regime. In 1993, the anti-EU UK Independence 
Party (UKIP) was founded and became the strongest party in elections to 
the European Parliament in 2014. In a typology of the typical attitudes of 
people in the different EU member states toward the EU, Britons exhibited 
a special profile, seeing participation in European integration only as “a 
necessary evil” (Haller 2008:221-225). Only about one-quarter of Britons 
see the EU membership of their country as an advantage. Even premier Tony 
Blair (Prime Minister 1997-2007) had considered organizing a referendum 
on Britain’s EU membership in order to put an end to the ongoing discussion 
about this issue. In 2014, the conservative prime minister David Cameron 
entered into negotiations with the EU with the intent of giving Britain more 
leeway to restrict immigration, obtain more power for national parliaments 
to veto EU laws, and strengthen trade liberalisation and slash red tape; he 
was under great pressure to do this by EU-sceptical members of his own 
party. After his victory in the national election of 2015, and on the basis of 
his negotiations with the EU, Cameron announced that a referendum would 
be held about Britain’s EU membership in 2016. Soon, a fierce campaign 
in support of leaving the EU started, not only by UKIP and the influential 
large tabloid newspapers, but also from popular political figures such as 
Boris Johnson, the mayor of London; the consequence was the same as in 
Italy: A deep split between different camps, also in regional terms. The 
referendum results showed a clear majority for ‘leave’ in England and 
Wales, but a majority for ‘remain’ in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The 
negative outcome of the referendum was a shock to the continental members 
of the EU. Catastrophic scenarios were elaborated concerning the negative 
economic consequences of Brexit for Britain; none of these predictions 
has yet come true. All these reactions also show, in my opinion, that the 
EU-enthusiastic elites throughout Europe – like the British prime minister 
himself – did not consider the British referendum to be a truly open vote but 
rather a confirmation of the UK’s membership in the EU. This attitude also 
inspired the main critique of Cameron in continental EU circles.
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European integration: Where the split between elites’ and 
citizens’ understanding of democracy emerges most sharply
The process of European integration doubtlessly involves fundamental 
changes to the constitutions of its participant states. This situation also applies 
to the six founding members that in 1957 in Rome established a common 
economic market, and only later – through the treaties of Maastricht (1992) and 
Lisbon (2009) – continued to deepen the process of integration and to take more 
decisive steps “toward an ever closer Union”, as indicated in the programmatic 
statement of the Rome Treaty. The changes were symbolized in the change of 
name from the European Economic Community to the European Community, 
and lastly, the European Union. Today, not only is economic trade totally free 
within the Community, but the border controls of individual countries have 
been abolished in the Schengen area (26 EU member states), and the Union has 
competencies in many other areas, including elements of a common defence and 
army. It is evident that such a process changes significantly the political system 
and constitution of member countries, and thus should be subject to referendum. 
Three related issues are illuminative about the attitudes and behaviour of the 
European elites with regard to direct democracy: First, the varying readiness of 
the political elites in the different countries to submit the process of integration 
to a popular vote; second, the deep gulf between elites and citizens over this 
issue; and third, the reactions of the elites to negative outcomes.
First, in which countries was the process of integration submitted to referendum 
and in which not? The list of these countries is telling. It is very obvious that EU 
referenda were held much more frequently in countries with a strong democratic 
tradition, or with a constitution which is more open to involving citizens, not only 
elites, in fundamental political changes. Switzerland leads all other countries 
with regard to the number of referenda held about European integration; between 
1992 and 2014 no less than eleven referenda were held.12 Also, the outcomes 
of these referenda are highly significant from the perspective of the topics of 
this paper: In the majority of referenda, the proposals were accepted. Swiss 
citizens even accepted the obligation of Switzerland to contribute financially 
to the cohesion fund for the new East European member countries. However, 
all referenda proposals which involved full membership of Switzerland in the 
EEC or EU were rejected. Thus, the Swiss have an attitude very similar to that 
of the Britons: They strongly accept the idea of a free market, but are unwilling 
to give up national independence and state sovereignty. What is most important 
12  A list of EU-related referenda is contained in Haller 2008 (Table 1.2, p.11-12); a more complete 
one in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Referendums_related_to_the_European_Union. 
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for them (and explains why rejection of EU membership is most definitive in the 
rural, inner-Swiss cantons, but less strong in cities like Zurich or Geneva) is that 
the Swiss are not ready to dispense with their strong model of direct democracy, 
which would be overridden by decisions of EU authorities in Brussels in the 
case of full accession.
The two other countries in which a dozen or more referenda were held about 
EU-membership are Ireland and Denmark. In Ireland, this happened because 
Art. 46 of the Irish constitution states that any change in the constitution has to be 
ratified first by both houses of parliament, and then be submitted to referendum. 
Most of the Irish referenda found positive support  for participation in European 
integration. This was no surprise, given the fact that EU membership would 
provide Ireland with a strong ‘ally’ in its relations with the former colonial 
power England, and the significant financial support which it was liable to 
receive through EU regional and structural funds. However, in June 7, 2001, 
the Irish rejected the Nice Treaty; this was a far-reaching decision because the 
consent of all EU member states was necessary for the Treaty to take effect. The 
comments of the elites about the result were that it was a misunderstanding, 
or a ‘Betriebsunfall’; afterwards, negotiations began between Ireland and the 
EU (which confirmed, among other things, that Ireland would not have to 
participate in a common EU defence policy). A second referendum, held later 
in the year, confirmed Ireland’s consent with a majority of 62.9%. A similar 
process happened in Denmark. In this country, all referenda about European 
integration also turned out positively. In June 1992, however, the Danes 
rejected the Maastricht Treaty with 50.7% of the votes; again, the EU rule came 
into force, as expressed in a satirical poem by the German writer Christian 
Morgenstern (1871-1914): “Things cannot exist which should not exist”. After 
some negotiations, leading to several opt-out concessions for Denmark, 56.7% 
of voters accepted the treaty. 
There are only a few countries that have never held a referendum about 
membership in the integration process. They include Germany and Italy, the two 
countries which experienced institutionalized fascism in the twentieth century, 
and Bulgaria and Greece. The latter two countries are not presently recognized 
for their particularly strong democratic systems. In Greece, a referendum was 
held on July 5, 2015 about whether the country should accept bailout conditions 
relating to its debt crisis; very harsh conditions were imposed by the EU 
Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank. 
The announcement and management of this referendum, as well as the action 
taken afterwards, are an additional example of how political leaders and elites 
– in this case, both national and European elites – can misuse the instrument 
of direct democracy. First, the time period between the conditions proposed by 
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the Troika and the announcement of the referendum by premier Alexis Tsipras 
was  extremely short and the period between announcement and execution was 
too short for an extended discussion (only about a week); the content of the 
referendum was also problematic since the Greek constitution forbids referenda 
about financial matters (which, per se, is also a problematic issue). The reaction 
of the EU was extremely negative – partly well-justified, partly not.13 In spite 
of the fact that voters had rejected the EU-proposal by a clear majority (61%), 
Tsipras effected a drastic turnaround in his politics and introduced pension cuts, 
tax increases, and other austerity measures that were harsher than those rejected 
by the voters in the referendum.
Italy and Germany are the only two West European countries in which no 
referenda about EU integration have been held. 14 In Germany, many members 
of the scientific and political elite criticized this fact strongly, arguing that EU 
membership and the institutional deepening of the EU with the transfer of 
many powers to the EU fundamentally affect the German constitution (Haller 
2008:230). It is evident that these two countries were once home to the most 
authoritarian and aggressive fascist regimes. The present-day German political 
elites not only consider it superfluous to ask their citizens about their consent to 
integration, they even consider the idea to be ‘dangerous’, given the country’s 
fascist past.
Thus, we have seen already in this short overview that there obviously 
exists a deep split between elites and citizens about European integration in 
most EU member countries. The split is evident from looking at the results of 
referenda and votes within the parliaments in countries where both forms of 
decision-making were used in the 1990s (see Figure 1.1 in Haller 2008, p.13). 
In all countries (Denmark 1992, Switzerland 1992, France 1992, Austria 1994, 
Finland 1994, Sweden 1994), membership in the EU was accepted by a majority 
of between two-thirds and 90% in the respective parliaments, but approved 
by only a narrow majority of the population (between 51 and 60%); in many 
countries (including Norway and Switzerland), parliaments favoured accession, 
but the population rejected it (Tables 1.2a and 1.2b in Haller 2008, p.11-12). 
Only in the post-communist Central East European countries where such 
referenda were held in 2003-2004 did the population support accession in higher 
proportions, but in many cases, turnout was very low (46% in Hungary, between 
13  For instance, the claim by Juncker that there were no pension cuts in the proposal was contested 
by the Financial Times (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_bailout_referendum,_2015, 
(22.4.2017).
14  In Italy, a “consultative“ referendum was held on May 18, 1989 before the negotiations about the 
Maastricht treaty in order to give the European Parliament a mandate to elaborate the European 
Constitution.
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52 and 55% in Slovakia and the Czech Republic). Thus, it is understandable that 
the elites were originally sceptical about referenda concerning the deepening 
and enlargement of the EU, and today are even more so.
This became more evident after the remarkable rejection of the European 
Constitution by 55% of the French and 63% of the Dutch in 2005, which was also 
perceived as a shock to the elites. Here, their reaction was most remarkable. The 
EU Constitution was revised in some minor regards (for instance, by removing 
all references to symbols of a ‘European nation’ such as the words ‘flag’ 
and ‘anthem’, and mentions of the term ‘constitution’), but was nevertheless 
institutionalized under the name the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. The chairman of 
the body which elaborated the EU constitution, former French president Valerie 
Giscard d’Estaing, openly confirmed this strategy, which cannot be called other 
than deceptive: “Looking at the content … the result is that the institutional 
proposals of the constitutional treaty….are found complete in the Lisbon Treaty, 
only in a different order and inserted in former treaties.”15 He also said that “only 
the format has been changed to avoid referendums”.16 In several countries (Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Poland and Portugal) referenda 
about the EU constitution were planned, but not carried out after the negative 
outcomes in France and the Netherlands. After Brexit in 2016, the negative 
attitude of the elites to referenda because of their unpredictable outcomes came 
again to the fore. This was most frankly formulated by former German president 
Joachim Gauck (2012-2017) who repeatedly expressed his view that citizens are 
not able to make rational decisions about complex issues. He said in television 
interview in regard to Brexit: “The elites are the not the problem, at the moment 
the people are the problem”. A similar statement – “plebiscites are a premium 
for demagogues” – was made by the first, highly respected German president 
(1949-1959) Theodor Heuss (quoted in Grotz 2009:296).
The European Citizens’ Initiative – buried alive?
In 2012, the European Union itself introduced the possibility of a Citizens’ 
Initiative (ECI) at the level of the Union, based on the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009. 
This makes it possible for every citizen of the Union to propose legislation on 
15   Quoted in the British newspaper, The Telegraph; see http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/1567804/Giscard-EU-Treaty-is-the-constitution-rewritten.html. 
16   Quote in http://www.eudemocrats.org/eud/uploads/downloads/e-Lissabon_til_nettet.pdf. 
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any topic for which the Union has the competence to legislate.17 In order to be 
successful in this regard, a “citizens’ committee” must be organized, composed 
of at least seven EU citizens residing in seven different EU member states. 
This initiative will be scrutinized by the Commission and the EU Parliament; 
if accepted, the committee can then collect signatures for a maximum of one 
year. An initiative is deemed successful if at least one million signatures from 
citizens in at least six member states are obtained; in this case, the Commission 
must take a position regarding the initiative within three months, but is not 
obliged to convert it into binding law.
This opportunity has been received enthusiastically all over Europe as the 
first transnational form of direct democracy; experiences since 2012, however, 
are disappointing. In one review, the authors write that it has been “buried 
alive” (Schmidt/ Breinschmid 2017). There are several reasons for this. First, 
the number of ECI’s has decreased continuously; in the first year (2012) 23 
ECI’s were organised, but in 2016 only three. The reasons were the significant 
bureaucratic obstacles, and the small chance of success if proponents cannot 
dispose of an effective Europe-wide social network (such as unions, or well-
established NGOs, etc.). Second, none of the successful initiatives led to concrete 
EU legislation, although some minor policy changes have resulted. The EU thus 
far has not simplified the initiative process – in fact, the Commission itself has 
developed a more negative attitude toward ECIs, calling them a potential danger 
to the integration process, liable to stir up mainly controversial and emotionally-
laden topics.18 This negative stance is all the more surprising since the main 
apprehensions about the instrument from the start were that the ECI would be 
hijacked by special interests and dominated by powerful interest groups and 
lobbies.
Why the Swiss are firmly attached to their political system.  
The consequences of direct democracy
As stated in the introduction, Switzerland is the model country for direct 
democracy. In the course of the twentieth century, there were probably more 
referenda held in Switzerland than in the rest of the world (for the statistics 
since 1971, see Kost 2008:84f.). The political system of this country has been 
influenced significantly by the extensive practice of direct democracy. Thus, 
17   See the detailed information at http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/basic-facts. 
18   The ECI against artificial insemination (“Father, mother and child”) was seen as such an example 
by the Commission.
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it represents a good case for testing Hypothesis 6. The simple fact that both 
citizens and elites fully accept this system is proof that its positive outcomes may 
be considered more important than the negative ones. It seems just, however, to 
now present a list of the main positive and negative outcomes based on some of 
the extensive literature on the Swiss (and some other) political systems (see, e.g. 
Kirchgässner et al. 1999; Linder 1999; Kriesi 2008; Frey/ Stutzer 2000; Lupia/ 
Matsusaka 2004; Matsusaka/ Trechsel 2005; Höglinger 2008; Bernhard 2012).
The positive effects of direct democracy in Switzerland (but also in other 
countries) include: a higher level of social and political integration; fewer 
political demonstrations and riots in cantons with more opportunities for 
direct democracy; a high level of integration; a certain convergence in political 
attitudes between elites and citizens; an increase in the number of interest 
groups, thus of social interests which are represented and organized in politics 
(the same has been observed for the USA; see Gabrinie 2010); more thrift in 
public spending (this does not imply, however, that citizens are not ready to vote 
for some measures which cost a lot of money); a higher level of socio-economic 
development; and, more satisfaction with democracy, and life in general.
In some regards, the outcomes are ambivalent or even negative. These 
downsides include: A tendency to conservatism and restrictions on reform; 
better representation of well-organized groups and better educated people; 
disadvantages for certain minorities (Haider-Markel et al. 2007); and the 
emergence of oligarchic groups and of clientelist, even corrupt practices (as 
exist in the Swiss banking system). Such effects must be countered if these 
practices are not to harm the population (Ziegler 1990).
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I started from the basic assumption of democratic elite theory 
that political elites must play an indispensable role in modern democracies. 
Elites in power, however, tend to prefer the system of representative democracy 
to that of direct democracy because the former awards them much more leeway 
in decision-making. I have also discussed several arguments used by elites – 
authoritarian and democratic – against direct democracy, and the strategies they 
have followed when putting it into effect. It was also shown that many of the 
deficiencies of concrete instances of direct democracy in present-day Europe 
were due to the misuse of this instrument by political leaders and agitators. In 
the process of European integration and at the level of the European Union itself, 
referenda have also often been instrumentalized to obtain the desired results. 
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From these findings, we can deduce some clear consequences with regard to 
the way in which direct democracy should be implemented so that it can be 
considered a valid and important instrument of modern democracy. The four 
main objections raised by elites against direct democracy are now considered:
1.  Direct democracy can be misused by inconsiderate leaders and elites. We 
have in fact seen that autocratic leaders try to use this process to strengthen 
their legitimacy, and that democratic leaders are also prone to use it for 
other purposes (e.g. to strengthen their power position). There are several 
measures which can be introduced to limit this problem: Define suitable 
barriers to referendum initiation (e.g., a minimum number of signatories) 
that are still not too high to make initiating referenda impossible; provide 
equal opportunities for all interested groups to promote their opinions; 
define financial limits for supporters of proposals; and, provide basic 
financial support for all parties involved.
2.  People are not well informed enough to be able to decide about complex 
political issues. This objection is certainly also true to a large degree. 
However, two arguments can be made here. First, the political elites 
themselves, such as parliamentary deputies, are often very badly informed 
about the issues on which they must decide. Evidence for this has been 
shown convincingly in the case of parliamentary decisions about European 
integration in Germany (See Haller 2008). Second, the government itself can 
ensure that all citizens have at least the possibility to obtain information, for 
instance, by distributing booklets about the advantages and disadvantages 
of a decision (this happens in Switzerland). Third, the questions that are put 
to citizens must be very clear and unambiguous (often, very long questions 
are used that touch on different issues).
3.  Citizens are not interested in many political issues, and often do not 
participate in referenda. This problem can be overcome partly by the 
measures enumerated in (2). Another important conclusion here is that 
referenda must lead to definite political outcomes. The relevance of this 
can be shown at the national and EU level. In Austria, for instance, turnout 
at non-binding referenda is much lower than at binding referenda. At the 
EU level, low turnout is certainly related to the very weak consequences 
of referenda.
4.  Majority decisions in referenda may overrule and violate the views and 
rights of minorities. Here, several solutions are possible: First, a minimum 
level of turnout should be established only over which may results be 
considered valid; this may vary from 50% to 75%, depending on the issue 
at stake. Second, specific procedures must be implemented to preserve the 
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rights of minorities; if the rights of a minority or a small sub-region of a 
country is involved, a two-step procedure may be implemented: First, a 
vote should be held among the minority; only if a majority of this group 
agree with the carrying-through of a referendum should it be held. 
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